THE BACKGROUND OF THE ACT

The Places of Worship Act, 1991, was enacted in the backdrop of the Ram Mandir movement during the 1990s. Section 3 of the Act prohibits and criminalizes the conversion of a place of worship, as a whole or in part, from one religion to another or to a different sect of the same religion, while Section 4 of the Act bars courts from examining the religious character of a disputed place of worship, with a cut-off date of August 15, 1947. Section 5 exempted the Ram Janmabhoomi dispute because of its unique cultural and political nature. The legislative intent of the Act can be inferred to be the preservation of the constitutional objectives of harmony and fraternity among different social groups, which might weaken with continuous claims and counterclaims of such nature. While the objective of the Act was to preserve harmony in society, mounting litigation and different court judgments might weaken the very purpose for which this Act was enacted.

CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE ACT

The constitutional validity of the Act was upheld in the case of M. Siddiq (D) Thr Lrs v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors. (Ayodhya judgment). Here, the Court noted that, "The Places of Worship Act is intrinsically related to the obligations of a secular state. It reflects the commitment of India to the equality of all religions." In 2020, a petition titled Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India was filed in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the Act, arguing that Section 4 of the Act bars judicial review, which is recognized as part of the basic structure doctrine. It was also argued that the cut-off date of August 15, 1947, is arbitrary and is not based on any logical contention. They further argued that it violates Articles 14, 15, 25, and 26 by restricting the religious freedom of Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists. During the hearing of the petition in 2024, a Supreme Court bench headed by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna, ordered that though fresh suits may be filed, no suits would be registered and no proceedings shall be undertaken till the next order of the Court. Along with that, in the pending suits, no Court will pass any effective interim orders or final orders, including orders directing surveys, etc.

MOUNTING LITIGATION

During a hearing on allowing a survey of the Gyanvapi Masjid in Varanasi, then Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud made an observation that the Places of Worship Act does not bar courts from investigating the nature of places of worship; rather, it prohibits the alteration of their religious character. This means that courts could determine the character of a place of worship, which opened the gates for courts to be flooded with litigation challenging the character of a number of monuments.

Following this observation, various lower court judgments have weakened the core purpose of the Places of Worship Act by allowing suits which tend to evaluate the historical character of numerous monuments. Some of these decisions are the Varanasi District Court's decision to examine the religious character of the Gyanvapi Masjid in Rakhi Singh v. Anjuman Intezamia Masajid Committee, a civil suit before the Chandausi District Court seeking the evaluation of the Shahi Jama Masjid in Sambhal, while the Jaunpur District Court admitted a suit to evaluate the Atala Mosque in Swaraj Vahini Association v. Waqf Atala Masjid. Similarly, the Lucknow District Court allowed proceedings to determine the character of the Teele Wali Masjid in Nripendra Pandey and Others v. UOI.

In Rajasthan, the Ajmer Civil Court ruled to evaluate the character of the renowned Ajmer Dargah in Vishnu Gupta v. Ajmer Dargah Committee. In the south, the Third Additional Civil Court in Mangaluru admitted a suit to examine the Malali Mosque in T. A. Dhananjaya and B. A. Manoj Kumar v. Mosque Authorities. The national capital has seen similar litigation, with the Saket District Court evaluating the Quwwat-ul-Islam Mosque in a civil suit filed on behalf of the Jain deity Tirthankar Lord Rishabh Dev.

By collectively entertaining these suits, lower courts across the nation are systematically bypassing the 1991 statutory bar, which might weaken the objective of the Places of Worship Act.

AMASR ACTS AS THE STATUTORY EXEMPTION AND RECENT BHOJSHALA CONTROVERSY

Section 4(3)(a) of the Places of Worship Act carves out an exception for monuments protected as monuments of national importance under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958. This provision means that a court can determine the religious character of such monuments. Under the provisions of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958, the Government can notify any monument as a monument of national importance if it is more than 100 years old and fulfils other statutory conditions. This syllogism makes the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 vulnerable to misuse, as its exceptions, together with other legal conditions, can be used to weaken the very purpose for which the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 was enacted.

Using this exemption, a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench) delivered its verdict on May 15 this year regarding the religious property dispute of the Bhojshala Complex, declaring it to be the Hindu temple of Goddess Vagdevi (Saraswati). Challenging the verdict, a Special Leave Petition was filed in the Supreme Court. While hearing the matter, the Court directed the State of Madhya Pradesh to provide an adjacent site near the Maula Mosque complex to Muslims for offering namaz (Muslim prayer) on Fridays from 1:00 PM to 3:00 PM while the Bench hears the matter. In the same order, the Supreme Court refused to restore the status quo ante (the situation as it existed before), as demanded by the Muslim side. The Court also directed the Archaeological Survey of India to refrain from making any structural changes in the disputed monument till the Court decides the matter.

AFTERMATH

The mounting litigation in the lower courts and their decisions in matters such as the Gyanvapi Masjid, Shahi Jama Masjid, Atala Mosque, Teele Wali Masjid, Ajmer Dargah, Malali Mosque, and Quwwat-ul-Islam Mosque could weaken the very purpose for which the Places of Worship Act was enacted, that is, to preserve harmony and fraternity in Indian society. Along with this, the Supreme Court's recent order in the Bhojshala dispute, refusing to restore the status quo ante (the situation as it existed before) while directing the State to provide an adjacent site for offering namaz (Muslim prayer), underscores the legal friction that the Madhya Pradesh High Court's judgment has created between the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, and the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958. This friction complicates the intent of the 1991 Act. At the same time, the constitutional validity of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, is itself under consideration before the Supreme Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (2020). In the meantime, the Supreme Court Bench led by Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna ordered in December 2024 that no fresh suits shall be registered, and that no effective or final orders be passed in pending suits., making the Court's eventual decision likely to have important implications for the future of religious property disputes in India.

Author is a 2nd year Law student at Dharmashastra National Law University (DNLU), Jabalpur. Views are personal.